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Abstract
Public administration scholars tend to take for granted that
organizational adaptation is important. This common notion
that public organizations must adapt to stay alive has not
been put to the test in the field of public administration, how-
ever. Intriguingly, organization ecologists find that
adaptation does not matter and might even be counterproduc-
tive for individual organizations. They argue that the absence
of adaptation—which they refer to as structural inertia—
actually enhances the likelihood of survival. But organization
ecologists focus mostly on nonpublic organizations. This
prompts the question whether adaptation in public organiza-
tions really matters. In this article, we test these contrasting
claims (while controlling for design features) on a population
of U.S. federal independent public agencies (n5 142). Our
findings suggest a subtle narrative. We conclude that proac-
tive adaptation increases termination hazards. But inertia
does not seem to significantly enhance survival chances.
1 | THE PREMISE AND PROMISE OF ADAPTATION
Adaptation features in many treatises on both public and private organizations. It is often presented,
both explicitly and implicitly, as an organizational capacity that is key to both the performance and sur-
vival of organizations (Hood, 1991, p. 11; Kaufman, 1976, p. 69; Kettl, 2016; MacCarthaigh, 2014;
Thompson, 1967). As John Gardner (1995, p. xi) put it: “Failure to face the realities of change brings
heavy penalties. Individuals become imprisoned in their own rigidities. Great institutions deteriorate.
Civilizations fall.”
Anthony Downs (1967, p. 7) postulates that “no bureau can survive unless it is continually able to
demonstrate that its services are worthwhile to some group with influence over sufficient sources to
keep it alive.” And bureaus can only accomplish this “if they are agile enough to undertake new and
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more viable functions before it is too late” (p. 22). In his standard work on organizations, Aldrich
(1999, p. 194) observes that “an organization that cannot change in fundamental ways will constantly
be at risk.” In the literature on resilience, the ideal organization has the “capacity to change before the
case for change becomes desperately obvious” (Hamel & Välikangas, 2003, p. 513; cf. Boin & Van
Eeten, 2013; Duit, 2016). The assumed importance of adaptation has a Darwinian undertone: An orga-
nization needs to adapt constantly to preserve a life-sustaining fit with its environment (Fukuyama,
2014; Kettl, 2016; Wilson, 2002).
The necessity of adaptation is rarely questioned, either in academia or in practice. In fact, it is the
absence of adaptation that invites criticism. The classic critique on the bureaucratic organization points
to its “unadaptive” or “rigid” character (Perrow, 1986, p. 5; cf. Crozier, 1964; Merton, 1949). Jim
March (1991) coins the term “competency traps” in describing a failure to renew. This line of criticism
extends into the hubris thesis, which states that successful organizations are loath to change, become
rigid, lose touch with their environment, and fall deeply (Collins, 2009).
The criticism, in turn, gives rise to proposals that aim to make rigid, change-resisting bureaucracies
more adaptive. In his theory of institutional design, Goodin (1996, p. 40) advises “to design our institu-
tions in such a way as to be flexible, to admit of ‘learning by doing’ and to evolve over time. Thus we
might say revisability is one important principle of institutional design.” Reform movements have
emerged that seek to somehow “break” bureaucracy by “reinventing” it (e.g., Osborne & Gaebler,
1992). Their manifestos typically include references to delegating, redesigning, introducing, and devis-
ing new processes or ways of working to create an “innovative and flexible” organization (Wolf,
1997).
But does adaptation really work? Is it really critical to the survival of public organizations? There
is little empirical research to answer this question. It is clear that organizations change constantly
(Blau, 1955; Moore & Kraatz, 2011; Perrow, 1986, p. 166; Thompson, 1967). But it is not clear
whether this adaptation is effective (and, if so, how). There is some research on the relation between
adaptation and performance (Boyne, 2006), but the findings are far from conclusive (Baum & Oliver,
1991, p. 194). Wolf (1997) finds that “adaptability contributes modestly to the effectiveness of agen-
cies.” But in their study of Texas school districts, Boyne and Meier (2009a) report that organizational
adaptation had a negative impact on performance.
There is some evidence that adaptation enhances organizational survival (Bertelli, 2008; Greasley
& Hanretty, 2015). For instance, De Geus (1997) identifies adaptability as one of the factors that drives
corporate longevity. In their study of British agency responses to termination threats, Dommett and
Skelcher (2014) find that defense strategies mattered. In their study of New Deal agencies, Boin,
Kuipers, and Steenbergen (2010) conclude that adaptation explained, at least partially, why some New
Deal agencies lasted for decades, whereas others died young.
There is also evidence to the contrary. Organizational ecologists have shown that adaptation
has negative effects, making survival less likely (Bogaert, Boone, Negro, & van Witteloostuijn,
2016; Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1984, 1989; Wezel & van Witteloostuijn, 2006). Their research
suggests that inertia is a better way to weather turbulence than adaptation (cf. Boyne & Meier,
2009b).
In this article, we study the effects of organizational adaptation in the public sector. More specifi-
cally, we study how adaptation affected organizational survival in a set of 142 U.S. federal independent
agencies in the period 1933–2011.1 Our findings do not support the sweeping notion that adaptation
increases the survival chances of public organizations. In fact, our findings suggest that proactive adap-
tation (prior to changes imposed by the legislator) undermines an organization’s survival chances. But
our findings do not support the notion that inertia is a safer strategy. Rather, it appears that “Wilsonian”
responsiveness to legislative change is the best survival strategy.
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2 | ADAPTATION VERSUS INERTIA
In this section, we discuss two competing theories about the effects of adaptation. We articulate the
mechanisms underlying these theories to explain why they yield opposing empirical predictions. We
start with the idea that organizational adaptation should be rewarded with greater agency survival. We
then present the idea that such adaptation is risky and increases the chances of demise.
2.1 | The logic of adaptation
We define adaptation as the organizational capacity to implement changes that restore or maintain a fit
with the ever-changing expectations and values of key stakeholders. We thus define adaptation as a
goal-oriented activity, and not as the random outcome of small changes.
Many studies in organizational sociology and public administration suggest, if not assume, that
only those organizations that continuously adapt in response to changes in their environment can stay
alive (Child, 1972; Drazin & van de Ven, 1985; Goodsell, 2011; Moore & Kraatz, 2011). The underly-
ing assumption is that organizations require a minimal degree of explicit and implicit support from key
stakeholders; without the support of such stakeholders, organizations cannot attract the resources
required to survive.
An emerging mismatch between the expectations of stakeholders and the perceived performance of
an organization is thought to have negative consequences for a public organization. Such a mismatch
may trigger intense discussion about the organization’s way of operating, inviting change (Alink, Boin,
& ’t Hart, 2001; Ansell & Vogel, 2006; Crozier, 1964).
While many scholars consider adaptation important, they do not claim it is easy. Robert Merton
(1949) famously described how public organizations attract a certain type of personality that resists
change. Downs (1967, p. 9) argues that older organizations tend to be less flexible, “reducing the
bureau’s ability to adjust to new circumstances.” It is hard to change the institutionalized features of an
organization, especially when these embody proven success formulas.
In fact, it may be easier for public organizations not to change and to “‘rely on a certain amount of
inertia” (Downs, 1967, p. 8). Public organizations can resist change by building autonomy (Hargrove
& Glidewell, 1990; Selznick, 1957; Wilson, 1989), creating a buffer between organizational routines
and external influences (cf. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Thompson, 1967). But “few bureaus ever achieve
such perfect autonomy” (Downs, 1967, p. 9).
Adaptation comes in different forms. It can be either proactive (anticipating the perceived need to
change) or reactive (after a crisis or following the direct orders of stakeholders) (Ansell, Boin, & Far-
joun, 2015; Sch€on, 1973). Proactive change seems riskier, as there is no apparent need to instigate
change. Leaders will have to work harder to convince employees of the need for change than is the
case after an institutional crisis.
Adaptation can come in small steps (incremental change) or in a comprehensive radical reform pro-
gram leading to paradigmatic change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Hall, 1993). Many scholars recognize
a hierarchy of adaptation, assuming that small changes are easier to accomplish than large-scale, paradig-
matic changes (e.g., Genschel, 1997; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Lindner & Rittberger, 2003; Tushman,
Newman, & Romanelli, 1986). Yet, scholars also note that large-scale change is possible when crises pro-
vide so-called “windows of opportunity” (Alink et al., 2001; Cortell & Peterson, 1999; Kingdon, 1984).
2.2 | The logic of inertia
The ecology school in the field of organization theory offers a contrasting perspective on the effects of
organization-level adaptation. These scholars argue that organizational adaptation is both risky and
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hard to achieve. Their research suggests that the absence of adaptation enhances an organization’s sur-
vival chances. For an individual organization, weathering turbulence is therefore much wiser than
changing to accommodate it (cf. Boyne & Meier, 2009b).
Ecologists try to “understand the forces that shape organizational structures over long time spans”
(Freeman & Hannan, 1989, p. 426). Organizational adaptation is not one of those forces, these scholars
contend. Rather, “most of the variability in organizational structures comes about through the creation
of new organizations and organizational forms and the replacement of old ones” (Hannan & Freeman,
1984, p. 150).
These scholars do not deny that organizations change. In fact, “organizational changes of some
kinds occur frequently and organizations sometimes even manage to make radical changes in strategies
and structures” (Hannan & Freeman, 1984, p. 149). But such adaptations do not affect their survival
chances. Effective adaptation happens at the (macro) population level rather than the (micro) organiza-
tional level: New forms emerge, rendering existing ones obsolete in the competition over scarce
resources.
Ecology scholars do not believe that individual organizations are capable of adapting in an effective
and timely manner to dynamic environments. Organizations are not “rational, flexible and speedy
adapters to changing environmental circumstances” (Freeman & Hannan, 1989, p. 426). Their research
appears to confirm that individual organizations are “structurally inert” or “relatively inert”—meaning
that they rarely have the capacity to make meaningful or timely adaptations (Aldrich, 1999,
pp. 43–48).
There are at least three reasons why adaptation at the level of individual organizations is unlikely
to be effective. First, the process of developing and implementing change always incurs a wide range
of transaction costs (Barnett & Carroll, 1995; Gingrich, 2015). Change proposals usually generate
resistance, which “tend to generate short-run costs that are high enough that organizational leaders will
forego the planned reorganization” (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, p. 931). Organizational ecologists
expect that the costs rise as one proceeds up the hierarchy from peripheral to core change. But it is
these latter, more fundamental changes that are usually needed to stay afloat in dynamic environments.
A second reason is that organizational leaders do not have the information or cognitive capacities
required to design the changes that are needed to fit a rapidly changing and complex environment—an
assessment ecologists share with many public administration scholars. As Hannan and Freeman (1977,
p. 931) remind us, “leaders do not obtain anything close to full information on activities within the
organization and environmental contingencies facing the subunits.” But even if there was an all-seeing
leader, she would likely not have the intellectual capacities required to map out effective changes that
keep organization and environment in a tight fit. Freeman and Hannan (1989, p. 426) thus reject what
they call the “heroic images of managers” that we often encounter in the reform literature.
A third reason is timing. Even if organizations would manage to design and implement sensible
changes, environmental dynamics tend to outpace these changes (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; Peli,
1997). Organizational leaders may be smart, but they cannot outsmart their environment. Organizations
may change, but it is usually too little, too late (Sorge & van Witteloostuijn, 2004). As Moore and
Kraatz (2011, p. 850) argued in their study of the U.S. savings and loan industry, “the ability to change
itself is no guarantee to adaptive success.”2
From an ecological perspective, it is risky for an organization to change in response to environmen-
tal shifts. Ecological scholars stress the benefits of stability, which they consider a valuable organiza-
tional characteristic. Stakeholders, from customers to politicians, expect organizations (private and
public) to be accountable, reliable, and consistent. Hannan and Freeman (1984, p. 153) argue that “the
modern world favors collective actors that can demonstrate or at least reasonably claim a capacity for
reliable performance and can account rationally for their actions” (cf. Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
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Adaptation undermines the legitimacy derived from accountability, reliability, and consistency. Organi-
zations should therefore not change their identity or their legally sanctioned modus operandi.
Ecologists find that inert organizations—corporations that shun adaptation—are more likely to sur-
vive than their ever-adapting counterparts. It logically follows that organizational inertia—the absence
of adaptation—is the prescribed survival strategy (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Hannan & Free-
man, 1984; Wezel & van Witteloostuijn, 2006).
The question is whether these findings hold for individual public organizations. We should keep in
mind that the ecological perspective aims to explain “why there are so many (or few) kinds of organi-
zation” (Freeman & Hannan, 1989, p. 430); they are less interested in the effects of adaptation (which
is just one possible answer to their question; cf. Elston, 2014). Moreover, they are interested in popula-
tions—that is, in “aggregates of organizations rather than members” (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, p.
934). A population—think of construction firms, educational organizations, voluntary associations,
semiconductor manufacturers, or daily newspapers—is marked by a common form. Population ecology
seeks to explain why certain organizational forms fit certain environments. Certain “fixed repertoires of
action” work in certain environments. Shifting environments are nicer to some than to others. “The
diversity of organizational forms is isomorphic to the diversity of the environments” (Hannan & Free-
man, 1977, p. 939).
3 | TOWARD HYPOTHESES
We are interested in studying the effects of adaptation on the survival chances of public organizations.
We discuss two very different schools of thought. One assumes the critical importance of organiza-
tional adaptation: An organization must change to survive. The other school points out that individual
adaptation is unlikely to be successful, and more likely to further the gap between performance and
expectations. These scholarly traditions provide us with two possible, and opposing, effects:
Hypothesis 1: A public organization’s adaptation is positively associated with its likelihood of
survival.
Hypothesis 1alt: A public organization’s adaptation is negatively associated with its likelihood
of survival.
In our theoretical discussion, we speculated that the timing of an organization’s adaptive efforts
may matter. Proactive change is unforced and agency driven; it is not imposed on the organization by
its political or regulatory environment. Reactive change is a direct reaction to an external (legal) inter-
vention. Based on the public administration logic of adaptation, we may argue that proactive change is
more likely to be effective than reactive change, as the former allows for a certain degree of latitude in
shaping the way change is implemented (Ansell et al., 2015). The organizational ecology logic of iner-
tia, in contrast, argues that proactive change is best avoided: Change should only be initiated, if at all,
when enforced on the organization. This gives rise to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: Proactive change by a public organization is positively associated with its likeli-
hood of survival.
Hypothesis 2alt: Proactive change by a public organization is negatively associated with its
likelihood of survival.
Hypothesis 3: Reactive change by a public organization is positively associated with its likeli-
hood of survival.
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Hypothesis 3alt: Reactive change by a public organization is negatively associated with its like-
lihood of survival.
4 | RESEARCH DESIGN
4.1 | Case selection
We test our hypotheses on a set of 142 U.S. federal public agencies (see the Appendix for a complete
list).3 We constructed a detailed data set of the federal public agencies that are listed in the U.S. Gov-
ernment Manual (USGM) during the period 1935–2011 as “independent agency” for at least 1 year of
their existence. All these agencies have their own “entry” (section) in the USGM, which logs fairly
detailed information that allows us to collect, code, and compare data on those agencies.4 The USGM
contains information on “creation and authority,” “purpose,” and “organization.” The information is
annually supplied by the agency (by filling out detailed forms).
4.2 | Independent variable: Adaptation
In our empirical analysis, we conceptualize organizational adaptation as an intended effort to
implement changes to minimize the gap between external expectations and the professed ration-
ale of the organization’s goals and actions. Such changes may be implemented because the
organization is forced to do so by external pressure or because organizational leaders choose to
do so.
As organizations change all the time, the question is what we should count as adaptive behav-
ior. We consider mission change as an indicator of adaptive behavior. A mission indicates how an
organization brings incompatible goals together. Following Selznick (1957), we assume that an
organization’s mission statement reflects its formal commitments (as viewed by that organization).
We further assume that mission statements are not easily changed (Perrow, 1986; Selznick, 1957;
Wilson, 1989). We assume that when an organization changes its mission statement, it reflects a
shift in leadership perception of core values and goals (Aldrich, 1999; Goodsell, 2011; Selznick,
1957; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Wilson, 1989). Mission change thus reflects organization-
level adaptive capacity.
For each year after 1933, we used USGM information on each U.S. federal independent agency to
trace and register annual mission changes. We looked for additions to mission statement and removals
from mission statement. Each USGM entry was examined for newly stated purposes in its distinctly
itemized mission statement (either stated separately or under the subcategory “purpose”). Each new
purpose was counted as an addition to the mission statement on its first appearance in a USGM entry
for that agency in a given year. We coded additions in absolute numbers. Similarly, we coded the num-
ber of purposes that were removed from the mission statement when compared to the agency’s mission
statement of the previous year (again, in absolute numbers). We differentiate between “minor” mission
change (one change in the mission statement) and “major” mission change (two or more changes).
As expected, it appears harder to make more fundamental changes: We counted 153 major changes
and 1,029 minor changes. On average, agencies saw one minor mission change in 5 years and one
major change in 20 years. Intriguingly, there is quite some variance in adaptive behavior. Forty-two
agencies never changed their mission (6 did it once, and 12 agencies did it twice). This seems to con-
firm the idea that organizations tend to be inert. Yet, 13 agencies changed their mission at least 20
times.
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We are also interested to see if the timing of adaptation matters. Does unprompted change (before
a legislative intervention) or prompted change (in reaction to, and hence after, a legislative interven-
tion) have a different effect on survival? We registered the number of legislative interventions intro-
duced to the organization. This information can be found in the USGM.5 We then make a distinction
between proactive change (1- or 2-year lead), contemporaneous change (in the year of legislative inter-
vention) and reactive change (1- or 2-year lag) vis-a-vis legislative interventions targeting the focal
agency.
4.3 | Dependent variable: Survival
To study the effects of adaptation, we focus on survival chances or durability of U.S. federal independ-
ent public agencies. We define durability as the likelihood of an agency being terminated in a given
year. Defining termination (and creation) of organizations is no easy task. We kept our definitions as
closely as possible to those of scholars who struggled with this challenge before us (e.g., Carroll &
Delacroix, 1982; Greasley & Hanretty, 2015; Lewis, 2002, 2003; MacCarthaigh, 2014; Meyer, 1985;
Rolland & Roness, 2011).
We consider organizations terminated when they are explicitly mentioned as terminated or abol-
ished in the USGM (and without any indication of continuity beyond this official termination), split
into two or more new organizations (secession), absorbed into another office, or merged with another
office. We took the date specified by law or executive order (if available) as end date, and otherwise
coded the termination date according to the USGM.6
Seventy-four of the 142 agencies (52%) that were present in the USGM since 1933 had ceased to
exist on December 31, 2011.7 The presence of survivors implies right censorship, which means that
the outcome in terms of survival is unknown. The 20 cases (14%) that were established before 1933
are left-censored. Fifteen percent of the population (n5 22) did not “live” longer than 5 years. Most
terminated agencies (n5 41; 55% of all terminated agencies) were abolished within 12 years after their
creation. Eight of the terminated agencies were merged, replaced, or otherwise changed formally and
structurally. Three were replaced by a different agency with similar functions (n5 3; 4%), 4 were
absorbed into a larger agency (n5 4; 5%), and just 1 merged with an agency of equal size and respon-
sibilities (n5 1; <1%).
4.4 | Control variables
There are, of course, other explanations for survival. The most prominent alternative explanation is
offered by Lewis (2002, p. 103; see also Lewis, 2003, 2004), who shows that “brute public authority
to insulate agencies from the influence of other actors” enhanced survival chances in his population of
American federal government organizations. According to Lewis (2004), organizations that are prop-
erly “hardwired” at birth live longer. His findings suggest that institutional birth features matter more
than performance or adaptation later in life. If we want to study the effects of adaptation, we must con-
trol for this alternative explanation.
On creation, many agencies are equipped with a commission or board structure, as opposed to a
single administrator, with the intention of insulating them from political interference (Lewis, 2004). To
control for these differences in governing structures, we differentiated between agencies that at time of
birth were endowed with a board or commission structure (coded 1), and those agencies that are not
(coded 0). Each agency description in the USGM commences with a listing of job titles in which board
and commission members are mentioned in a separate section.
Another design variable for which we control is the presence or absence of a sunset clause, which
is a provision that specifies when an organization will cease to exist. A sunset clause, assigned a 1
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code, limits the expected lifespan of an agency. We scored any formal manifestation of transient inten-
tions for the agency as the presence of a sunset clause. These include stipulations about a fixed budget
for the entire lifespan, attainment of a specific goal, or an official cutoff date. If none of these precondi-
tions are mentioned in the first listing of USGM, we coded a 0.
Following Lewis (2003), we also control for legislative origin. Agencies that are created after
lengthy legislative procedures, involving heavy scrutiny and majority requirements, are thought to be
less susceptible to termination than those agencies created by executive actions. To determine to which
extent the legislature was involved in the creation process of agencies in our population, we traced the
inception mandates of each agency in the USGM and in the USGM’s History of Agency Organiza-
tional Changes (2011). We coded agencies initiated by act with a 1 as having a “strong legislative ori-
gin,” those that had a reorganization plan at their basis with a 2, those established by an executive
order with a 3, and those initiated by departmental or military order, which arguably could be classified
as having the weakest legislative origin, with a code 4.
To control for agency size, we used the Budget of the United States Government (1933–2011) to
retrieve the budgets of all agencies for each year during their existence. After calculating the budget
median of our population, we ranked the agencies from smallest to largest budget. The agencies in the
first quartile are categorized as a small budget agency (coded 1), and agencies in the second, third, and
fourth quartiles are considered to be large budget agencies (coded 0).
In times of war, federal budget routines tend to be disturbed. Hence, the years of the following
wars are coded as war years (coded 1): World War II (1941–1945), Korean War (1950–1953), Viet-
nam War (1965–1975), Gulf War (1990–1991), Afghanistan War (2001–2011), and the Iraq War
(2003–2011).
4.5 | The model
We used event-history analysis (Tuma & Hannan, 1984) to empirically estimate the termination or
mortality hazard of each agency in our population. We formally define mortality hazard as:
lðuÞ5 lim
Du!0
Pr ðtermðu1DuÞjno termðuÞÞ
Du
;
which reads as the likelihood that an agency ceases to exist between its age u and u1Du, provided that
it did not exit at or prior to u. We use a semiparametric Cox proportional hazard rate specification
(Cox, 1972) in modeling the mortality hazard, which is a product of an unspecified baseline hazard,
l0(t), and a vector xt specifying the influences of covariates:
l tð Þ5l0 tð Þ exp b0xtð Þ
Results not reported here indicate that qualitatively similar results are obtained when employing
piecewise exponential models (results available on request).
5 | FINDINGS
We present our findings in a set of tables. Table 1 provides means, standard deviations, minimum and
maximum values, and correlations. Table 2 presents the results of our event-history analysis. We use
four models. Model 1 shows the effects of the control variables. Model 2 takes into account the pair of
adaptation variables relating to additions and removals in mission statements. Models 3 and 4 include
the variables related to the timing of mission change vis-a-vis legislative intervention. We report odds
ratios. A coefficient below 1 implies a positive effect on the likelihood of survival; a coefficient above
1 indicates a negative impact.
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TABLE 2 Cox proportional hazards models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
War years 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Federal revenues 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Board 0.68 0.68 0.65† 0.67
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Sunset clause 2.81** 2.78** 2.49* 2.67**
(1.02) (1.00) (0.93) (0.99)
Weak legislative origin 1.57** 1.57** 1.56** 1.56**
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Small (budget) agency 3.29** 3.24** 3.13** 3.15**
(0.83) (0.81) (0.79) (0.80)
No change 2.95 1.65 1.70 2.41
(2.08) (2.07) (2.13) (3.10)
Magnitude of change
Mission statement add. 0.40 0.39 0.43
(0.37) (0.33) (0.33)
Mission statement rem. 1.14 1.13 1.19
(0.30) (0.32) (0.31)
Relative timing of change
Same-year change 3.58† 8.75**
(2.33) (5.33)
Reactive change (1-year lag) 0.23
(0.22)
Proactive change (1-year lead) 7.43**
(3.23)
Reactive change (2-year lag) 0.12*
(0.13)
Proactive change (2-year lead) 4.06**
(1.90)
Log likelihood 2309.07 2308.29 2302.50 2301.72
Chi2 45.75 68.88 85.88 94.51
AIC value 632.14 634.58 629.00 627.44
Observations 4,885 4,885 4,885 4,885
Note. Hazard ratios are reported; robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p< .10. *p< .05. **p< .01.
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Surprisingly, we do not find any evidence that adaptation matters, either by enhancing or limiting
the chances of survival (Hypotheses 1 and 1alt). Although additions to the mission statement appear to
be consistently negatively related to the likelihood of termination, and removals from the mission state-
ment seem to positively affect the hazard, both effects are not statistically significant. We must there-
fore conclude that mission change does not affect the likelihood of survival. At the same time, we do
not find any effects for inertia.
When we take into account the timing of mission change (Hypotheses 2 and 3), we must conclude
that proactive change is very risky. Model 3 shows that changing the mission statement a year prior to
a legislative change significantly elevates the mortality hazard by over 7 times. Even the co-occurrence
of mission change and legislative intervention in the same year significantly undermines survival chan-
ces.8 Reactive change with a 1-year lag, in contrast, lowers the mortality hazard (marginally significant
at p< .10). This supports Hypothesis 2alt.
When we extend the lead and lagged effects from 1 year to 2 years (Model 4), we find similar
results. This extension should deal better with concerns about autocorrelation and multicollinearity,
and turns out to have substantially better model fit (2302.5 vs. 2301.7, with identical degrees of free-
dom). Changing an agency’s mission statement 2 years a priori again proves to be extremely risky.
Mission statement changes in the same year as a legislative intervention are still statistically significant
and positive, suggesting a greater mortality hazard when the two coincide. Reactive change with a lag
of 2 years in turn appears again to lower mortality, providing evidence for Hypothesis 3. All this sug-
gests that responsive agencies are much less likely to be sanctioned via termination than proactive
agencies (we return to this in the Discussion).
The control variables do not produce surprises. Small agencies (those in the smallest quartile in
terms of budget) are most vulnerable to termination. The agencies that were started with a sunset clause
and those with a weak legislative origin ran a higher risk of being terminated.9 The other control varia-
bles are nonsignificant in all four model specifications.
We ran a series of robustness checks, reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. Basically, our results
are not affected by: (a) including a public corporation dummy (Model 5), (b) adding a control for
young agencies (a dummy for agencies that exited before turning 5; Model 6), (c) using different size
quartiles (Model 7), (d) removing agencies established with sunset clauses (Model 8), and (e) entering
two proxies for political turnover (as captured by dummies for unfriendly president and unfriendly
majority; Model 9).
6 | DISCUSSION: ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION AND
INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS
This article’s central question is whether adaptation matters for public sector organizations. We
started out with the common assumption in the public administration literature that adaptation is
important if public organizations are to survive and prosper. We contrasted this assumption with
the organizational ecology argument that organizational adaptation will harm rather than enhance
a public organization’s survival chance. We examined both perspectives on adaptation in the popu-
lation of 142 U.S. federal independent agencies in the period 1933–2011, focusing on mission
change as a solid indicator of an organization’s capacity to adapt. In addition, we looked into the
impact of the timing of adaptation.
Our findings are quite surprising. It turns out that reactive change vis-a-vis legislative inter-
vention enhances the odds of survival; but proactive mission change (1 or 2 years before the
legislative intervention) and contemporaneous change (in the year of the intervention) substan-
tially increase the likelihood of termination. Intriguingly, this would imply that public
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agencies should not engage in proactive change (cf. Ansell et al., 2015). It is better to react to
legislative intervention by adapting the mission accordingly, preferably after some time has
passed.
This finding goes against the grain of many studies that prescribe an active role for bureaucratic
leaders, casting them as “entrepreneurs” (Boin, 2001; Hargrove & Glidewell, 1990; Ricucci, 1995).
Our findings suggest that bureaucratic rule following—bureaucratic responsiveness to political deci-
sions—better serves the interest of a public organization.
Why is proactive change so risky? There are at least two possible explanations. First, agen-
cies that adapt proactively take a calculated risk. They change a mission that has not been sub-
jected to political scrutiny and that has not been delegitimized. Such change is therefore likely
to attract political attention, possibly nurturing a perception that the organization has problems.
It feeds on the idea that only underperforming agencies would change their mission (Andrews,
Boyne, & Enticott, 2006; Boyne, 2006). A second reason lies in the costs of reorganization (a
well-documented impediment to reform); smart organizations only do this when they absolutely
must.
It is possible that we did not adequately measure organizational adaptation. We looked at changes
to the mission of an organization, assuming that this type of change is an indicator of “core” adapta-
tion. But organizations may well adapt constantly, and much more effectively, by a series of small,
incremental changes in policies and tools (second-order or peripheral changes that are much harder to
measure).
Also, we need to be cautious about the divergence between “talk” and “action” in organizations
(Brunsson, 1989). It may well be that the mission, and the adaptation thereof, masks what the organiza-
tion really does. We need in-depth qualitative case studies to probe into such dynamics (see, for fasci-
nating examples, Doig, 2001; Hargrove, 1994).
Our study did not explicitly measure levels of political support for public organizations. Some
organizations could be at risk for termination because they have weaker support whereas other organi-
zations can be inert because they enjoy high levels of support. An in-depth qualitative approach is
needed to find out if external support or interest group pressure provide alternative explanations for
both adaptation and survival.
Finally, it is possible that the extent of environmental change is not fully captured by equating it to
legislative interventions. Our notion of preemptive change does take into account the possibility that
agencies respond to other environmental prompts such as funding change, presidential unilateral action,
and court cases. We assumed that changes in the external environment eventually translate into legisla-
tive changes, but the relative inactivity of Congress in recent years casts some doubt on this
assumption.
These limitations point to promising avenues of future research. One way to make progress is to
code the perceptions of an agency’s performance (cf. Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). It would also be
interesting to code for different types of organizational adaptation strategies, both “deep” or fundamen-
tal and “superficial” or incremental, to explore whether the nature of change and the temporal patterns
of change types may matter. Future research could also compare our findings with studies of similar
populations in other countries (Laegreid, Rolland, Roness, & Agotnes, 2010; MacCarthaigh, 2014;
Yesilkagit & Christensen, 2011), and of other types of public organizations.
Our findings offer inconclusive support for the insights derived from organizational ecology. We
find no evidence that inertia has an effect on survival chances. These insights have been much applied
in the business and sociology literatures, but not so much in the study of public organizations. Future
work should extend the ecological analysis of public organizations by further exploring alternative
mechanisms, a prominent example being the density dependence conception of organizational
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selection, which organizational ecology argues is a much more powerful force than organizational
adaptation (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1989).
This article is one of the first to investigate the effects of adaptation on survival. Our findings
cast doubt on the widespread belief in the benefits of organizational adaptation. It may well be that
future research rescues the belief in adaptation from the forces of inertia. In the absence of more
positive findings, we must caution against perspectives that sing the praise of proactive adaptation.
Waiting for a clear order—Wilsonian responsiveness—may be most beneficial to an agency’s sur-
vival prospects.
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NOTES
1 To be sure, we are not seeking to explain organizational survival. We want to study whether adaptation
has effects, and we study these effects in terms of survival.
2 Moore and Kraatz (2011) argue that adaptation is likely to be more effective when organizations change
slowly in response to their environment, and stay close to their organizational competences (p. 861).
3 We excluded cabinet bureaus because the USGM contains little or inconsistent information on them. One
might also argue that their dependence on the whims of executives is itself an explanatory factor for sur-
vival. Neither agency components nor suboffices were included, as by their very nature they perish much
more easily and frequently than the independent agencies they are part of.
4 For reasons of size, organizational unity, and distinctiveness, we excluded: (a) bilateral or multilateral
organizations; (b) monuments and celebrations (e.g., bicentennials) commissions; (c) foreign claims com-
missions; (d) committees, advisory councils, or boards consisting of only ex officio members (such as the
Secretary of Defense and State together advising the president as “Council X or Y”) or functionaries or
representatives of other organizations, which do not form a standing organization; and (e) agencies with
only a single state purpose (e.g., Delaware River Basin Commission, Virginia State Boundary Commis-
sion, and Alaska Power Administration).
5 Legislative intervention can be introduced by executive authority (executive or departmental order; reor-
ganization plans) or legislative authority (the act of law). Following Lewis (2003), we take intervention by
act of law as an indicator of important shifts in an agency’s environment.
6 We took a sample of 20 cases from our population (representing both “short-lived” and durable agencies)
and checked intercoder reliability between the two researchers who did all the coding work. Out of 12,800
observations, we found 665 differences, which results in intercoder reliability of 94.8%. Each difference in
observation (even if this pertained to only a fraction difference on a code scale) was interpreted most
strictly, as full difference.
7 Due to unavailability of data for 2012/2013, we decided to take December 31, 2011 as an artificial end
point.
8 Co-concurrence may actually indicate a form of proactive change, due to the lag time between legislative
change and the materialization of mission changes in the USGM.
9 As innovation and reinvention might be less likely in temporary organizations, we estimated the
same set of models on agencies that did not have an expiration date. More specifically, we tested the
models on the population without sunset clauses (excluding 17 cases). We did not find a difference
in effects.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 Robustness checks
(6) (7) (8)
(5)
(With corporation
control)
(With control
firms< 5
years)
(With other
size
quartiles)
(Without
sunset
clause)
(9)
(Unfriendly
context)
War years 0.89 0.82 0.90 0.89 0.80
(0.23) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.22)
Federal revenues 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Board 0.73 0.68 0.68 0.71 0.66†
(0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15)
Sunset clause 3.10** 2.90** 2.74** 2.42*
(1.17) (1.13) (1.00) (0.87)
Weak legislative
origin
1.60** 1.57** 1.56** 1.60** 1.54**
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Small agency (up
to 25th percen-
tile)
3.00** 3.19** 3.20** 2.87** 3.34**
(0.77) (0.82) (0.98) (0.70) (0.86)
Medium agency
(25th to 50th
percentile)
0.87
(0.33)
Medium agency
(50th to 75th
percentile)
1.12
(0.42)
Mission state-
ment add.
2.51 2.25 2.25 2.21 2.68
(3.17) (2.92) (3.13) (2.74) (3.54)
Mission state-
ment rem.
0.46 0.41 0.43 0.47 0.44
(0.35) (0.31) (0.33) (0.37) (0.33)
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TABLE A1 (Continued)
(6) (7) (8)
(5)
(With corporation
control)
(With control
firms< 5
years)
(With other
size
quartiles)
(Without
sunset
clause)
(9)
(Unfriendly
context)
No change 1.18 1.18 1.19 1.21 1.15
(0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.27) (0.31)
Same-year
change
9.17** 9.17** 8.90** 7.35** 10.35**
(5.51) (5.58) (5.36) (4.51) (6.85)
Reactive change
(2-year lag)
0.13* 0.11* 0.12* 0.15† 0.11*
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12)
Proactive change
(2-year lead)
3.82** 3.82** 4.05** 4.86** 3.15*
(1.77) (1.75) (1.89) (2.33) (1.61)
Corporation 0.56
(0.27)
Young agencies 2.71†
(1.39)
Unfriendly
president
0.42**
(0.12)
Unfriendly
majority
0.96
(0.29)
Same-year
change
Reactive change
(1-year lag)
Proactive change
(1-year lead)
Reactive change
(2-year lag)
Proactive change
(2-year lead)
Log likelihood 2300.75 2300.09 2301.53 2305.50 2296.56
Chi2 93.50 98.80 94.78 84.78 93.85
AIC value 627.50 626.18 630.06 633.00 621.12
Observations 4,885 4,885 4,885 4,885 4,885
Note. Hazard ratios are reported; robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p< .10, * p< .05, ** p< .01.
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TABLE A2 List of agencies in the population
Name of agency Established Terminateda
Action 1-Jul-1971 31-Mar-1995
Administrative Conference of the U.S. I 13-Apr-1961 31-Oct-1995
Administrative Conference of the U.S. II 3-Mar-2010 Still exists
Aeronautical Board 11-Okt-1916 27-Jul-1948
African Development Foundation 20-Nov-1980 Still exists
Agricultural Adjustment Administration 12-Jun-1933 26-Jul-1945
Atomic Energy Commission 1-Aug-1946 11-Oct-1974
Board of Surveys and Maps of the Federal Government 30-Dec-1919 10-Mar-1942
Board of War Communications 24-Sep-1940 24-Feb-1947
Broadcasting Board of Governors 1-Oct-1999 Still exists
Canal Zone Government 24-Aug-1912 27-Sep-1979
Central Intelligence Agency 26-Jul-1947 Still exists
Central Statistical Board 9-Aug-1933 25-Jul-1940
Civil Aeronautics Board (former Civil Aeronautics Authority) 23-Jun-1938 4-Oct-1984
Civil Defense Coordinating Board 11-May-1955 1-Jul-1958
Civilian Conservation Corps (former Emergency Conserva-
tion Work)
5-Apr-1933 2-Jul-1942
Commodity Credit Corporation 16-Oct-1933 Still exists
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 23-Oct-1974 Still exists
Community Services Administration 4-Jan-1975 13-Aug-1981
Consumer Product Safety Commission 27-Oct-1972 Still exists
Corporation for National and Community Service 1-Oct-1993 Still exists
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 29-Sep-1988 Still exists
Development Loan Fund 14-Aug-1957 4-Sep-1961
Displaced Persons Commission 25-Jun-1948 31-Aug-1952
Economic Cooperation Administration 3-Apr-1948 10-Oct-1951
Electric Home and Farm Authority 12-Aug-1935 13-Oct-1942
Energy Research and Development Administration 11-Oct-1974 4-Aug-1977
Environmental Protection Agency 2-Dec-1970 Still exists
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2-Jul-1964 Still exists
Export Import Bank 2-Feb-1934 Still exists
Farm Credit Administration 27-Mar-1933 Still exists
Federal Aviation Agency 28-Aug-1958 Still exists
Federal Board of Hospitalization 1-Nov-1921 30-Jun-1948
Federal Civil Defense Administration 1-Dec-1950 1-Jun-1958
Federal Coal Mine Safety Board of Review 16-Jul-1952 30-Mar-1970
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Federal Communications Commission 19-Jun-1934 Still exists
Federal Coordinator of Transportation 16-Jun-1933 16-Jun-1936
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 16-Jun-1933 Still exists
Federal Election Commission 15-Oct-1974 Still exists
Federal Emergency Management Agency 31-Mar-1979 Still exists
Federal Emergency Relief Administration 12-May-1933 30-Jun-1938
Federal Energy Administration 7-May-1974 4-Aug-1977
Federal Home Loan Bank Board 22-Jul-1932 9-Aug-1989
Federal Housing Administration 27-Jun-1934 9-Sep-1965
Federal Housing Finance Agency 30-Jul-2008 Still exists
Federal Housing Finance Board 9-Aug-1989 30-Jul-2008
Federal Labor Relations Authority 1-Jan-1979 Still exists
Federal Land Bank Commissioner 17-Jul-1916 6-Aug-1953
Federal Loan Agency 1-Jul-1939 30-Jun-1947
Federal Maritime Commission 12-Aug-1961 Still exists
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 23-Jun-1947 Still exists
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 9-Nov-1977 Still exists
Federal Power Commission 23-Jun-1930 4-Aug-1977
Federal Prison Industries Incorporated 11-Dec-1934 Still exists
Federal Reserve 23-Dec-1913 Still exists
Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board 6-Jun-1986 Still exists
Federal Security Agency 1-Jul-1939 11-Apr-1953
Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation 16-Jun-1933 30-Jun-1940
Federal Trade Commission 26-Sep-1914 Still exists
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 1-Jul-1954 Still exists
Foreign Operations Administration 1-Aug-1953 9-May-1955
General Accounting Office (former Government Account-
ability Office)
10-Jun-1921 Still exists
General Services Administration 1-Jul-1949 Still exists
Government Patents Board 23-Jan-1950 24-Mar-1961
Government Printing Office 03-Apr-1861 Still exists
Housing and Home Finance Agency 27-Jul-1947 9-Sep-1965
Interstate Commerce Commission 7-Feb-1887 29-Dec-1995
Maritime Labor Board 23-Jun-38 22-Jun-1942
Merit System Protection Board (former Civil Service
Commission)
16-Jan-1883 Still exists
Motor Carrier Claims Commission 2-Jun-1948 31-Dec-1952
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration 29-Jul-1958 Still exists
National Archives and Records Administration 19-Jun-1934 Still exists
National Bituminous Coal Commission 30-Aug-1935 1-Jul-1939
National Capital Housing Authority (former Alley Dwelling
Authority)
12-Jun-1934 1-Jul-1974
National Capital Planning Commission (former National
Capital Park and Planning Commission)
6-Jun-1924 Still exists
National Credit Union Administration 10-Mar-1970 Still exists
National Emergency Council 17-Nov-1933 1-Jul-1939
National Forest Reservation Commission 1-Mar-1911 22-Oct-1976
National Foundation for the Arts and the Humanities 29-Sep-1965 Still exists
National Historical Publications Commission 19-Jun-1934 Still exists
National Housing Agency 24-Feb-1942 27-Jul-1947
National Labor Relations Board 5-Jul-1935 Still exists
National Mediation Board 21-Jul-1934 Still exists
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) 30-Oct-1970 Still exists
National Recovery Administration 16-Jun-1933 21-Dec-1935
National Science Foundation 10-May-1950 Still exists
National Security Training Commission 19-Jun-1951 25-Mar-1957
National Transportation Safety Board 15-Oct-1966 Still exists
National Youth Administration 26-Jun-1935 12-Jul-1943
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 15-Jan-1975 Still exists
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 28-Apr-1971 Still exists
Office of Censorship 19-Dec-1941 28-Sep-1945
Office of Government Ethics 26-Oct-1978 Still exists
Office of Management and Budget (former Bureau of the
Budget)
10-Jun-1921 Still exists
Office of Personnel Management 28-Dec-1978 Still exists
Office of Price Administration 11-Apr-1941 12-Dec-1946
Office of Special Counsel 1-Jan-1979 Still exists
Office of the Director of National Intelligence 22-Apr-2005 Still exists
Office of the Housing Expediter 22-May-1946 31-Jul-1951
Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion 3-Oct-1944 12-Dec-1946
Overseas Private Investment Corporation 19-Jan-1971 Still exists
Panama Canal Commission 29-Jun-1948 30-Sep-2004
Peace Corps 1-Mar-1961 Still exists
Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation 27-Oct-1972 1-Apr-1996
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Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 2-Sep-1974 Still exists
Petroleum Administration for War 2-Dec-1942 3-May-1946
Petroleum Administrative Board (former Petroleum Admin-
istration)
11-Sep-1933 31-Mar-1936
Postal Regulatory Commission (former Postal Rate Com-
mission)
12-Aug-1970 Still exists
President’s War Relief Control Board 25-Jul-1942 14-May-1946
Prison Industries Reorganization Commission/Administration 26-Sep-1935 30-Jun-1938
Railroad Retirement Board 29-Aug-1935 Still exists
Reconstruction Finance Corporation 22-Jan-1932 30-Jun-1957
Renegotiation Board 25-Mar-1951 10-Oct-1978
Resettlement Administration 30-Apr-1935 1-Jan-1946
Resolution Trust Corporation 9-Aug-1989 31-Dec-1995
Rubber Producing Facilities Disposal Commission 7-Aug-1953 20-Sep-1956
Rural Electrification Administration 11-May-1935 20-Oct-1994
Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation 13-May-1954 Still exists
Securities and Exchange Commission 2-Jul-1934 Still exists
Selective Service System 16-Sep-1940 Still exists
Small Business Administration 30-Jun-1953 Still exists
Social Security Administration 14-Aug-1935 Still exists
Subversive Activities Control Board 23-Sep-1950 30-Jun-1973
Tennessee Valley Authority 18-May-1933 Still exists
Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board (former Over-
sight Board for the Resolution Trust Corporation)
9-Aug-1989 29-Jul-1998
Trade and Development Agency 1-Jul-1980 Still exists
United States Agency for International Development 3-Nov-1961 Still exists
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 26-Sep-1961 21-Oct-1998
Unites States Board of Tax Appeals 2-Jun-1924 Still exists
United States Commission on Civil Rights (former Com-
mission on Civil Rights)
9-Sep-1957 Still exists
United States Employees Compensation Commission 7-Sep-1916 16-Jul-1946
Unites States Information Agency I 1-Aug-1953 1-Apr-1978
Unites States Information Agency II 1-Apr-1978 1-Oct-1999
Unites States International Trade Commission (former US
Tariff Commission)
8-Sep-1916 Still exists
United States Maritime Commission 29-Jun-1936 24-May-1950
United States Metric Board 23-Dec-1975 1-Oct-1982
United States Postal Service 22-09-1789 Still exists
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United States Railroad Administration 29-Aug-1916 1-Jul-1939
Veterans Administration 3-Jul-1930 Still exists
Veterans Education Appeals Board 13-Jul-1950 28-Aug-1957
Virgin Islands Corporation 30-Jun-1949 1-Jul-1966
War Finance Corporation 5-Aug-1918 1-Jul-1939
a“Still exists” refers to the end date of our study (31-Dec-2011).
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